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Abstract
This research provides evidence for the generality of the Muhammad Ali eect (Allison,
Messick, & Goethals, 1989), demonstrating that Dutch participants believe that the
trait honesty is more descriptive of the self than of others, whereas the trait intelligence
is believed to be equally descriptive of the self and others. Congruent with proposed
explanations for the Muhammad Ali eect, participants regard honesty as more
desirable, more controllable, and less verifiable than intelligence. Mediation analyses
indicated that the Muhammad Ali eect is stronger among participants who view
honesty as more desirable than intelligence. # 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Most people perceive themselves as better than—and not as bad as—others with
regard to both global attributes (e.g. trait terms such as honesty, generosity) and
specific behaviours (e.g. helping a friend, taking the smaller of two remaining pieces of
pizza) (see Alicke, 1985; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; for a recent
overview, see Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Allison, Messick and Goethals (1989)
extended this body of research by comparing self–other judgements of fair versus
unfair behaviours with self–other judgements of intelligent versus unintelli-
gent behaviours. Using converging methodology (i.e. thought-listing, self–other
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judgements), Allison et al. demonstrated that individuals think of the self as consider-
ably more moral (i.e. more fair and less unfair) and only slightly more intelligent than
others, a pattern of findings they termed the Muhammad Ali eect. The label derives
from Muhammad Ali’s (1975) autobiography, The Greatest: My Own Story. The
heavyweight boxing champion was asked whether he actually had failed the army
mental examination or had performed poorly to stay out of the army service. Ali’s
reply was ‘I only said I was the greatest, not the smartest’, thereby conveying a belief in
being more moral, rather than more intelligent, than others.
How can the Muhammad Ali eect be explained? Allison et al. (1989) advanced
three explanations, linking the Muhammad Ali eect to dierences between the
dimensions of morality and intelligence in terms of (a) desirability, (b) controllability,
and (c) verifiability. The desirability explanation assumes that morality is a more
desirable attribute than intelligence. Given that individuals assume greater super-
iority for attributes or behaviours that are more desirable (e.g. Alicke, 1985;
Messick et al., 1985), the Muhammad Ali eect may be a function of attribute
desirability. The controllability explanation assumes that morality is more con-
trollable than intelligence. Given that individuals are more strongly inclined to view
themselves as superior to the extent that the traits are controllable (i.e. something one
can choose to be or not to be; Alicke, 1985), the Muhammad Ali eect may be a
function of attribute controllability. Finally, the verifiability explanation assumes
that morality is less verifiable than intelligence. Evaluations regarding moral and
immoral behaviours are closely linked to judgements of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ intentions,
which tend to be unobservable and, therefore, relatively dicult to verify. In contrast,
evaluations of intelligent versus unintelligent behaviours are closely linked to
‘good’ and ‘bad’ performances, which tend to be directly observable and, there-
fore, relatively easy to verify. Because morality judgements presumably involve
greater interpretational or attributional ambiguity than intelligence judgements, it is
easier to maintain the belief that one is more moral (rather than more intelligent)
than others. Thus, the Muhammad Ali eect may be a function of attribute
verifiability.
The current research seeks to extend prior research on the Muhammad Ali eect in
several ways. First, we examine the generality of the eect by using honesty rather
than fairness as an indicator of morality, thereby assuming that honesty, like fairness,
tends to be more desirable, more controllable, and less verifiable than intelligence.
Also, prior research (Allison et al., 1989; Van Lange, 1991) examined the Muhammad
Ali eect among American undergraduate students. The current research seeks to
validate this eect using a Dutch sample, thereby assuming that the Muhammad Ali
eect generalizes across these two nations. Indeed, there are no compelling theoretical
or empirical reasons for anticipating substantial dierences between the United States
and the Netherlands (e.g. honesty and intelligence are evaluated similarly in the two
countries; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Second, prior research examined specific
behaviours, but has not tested whether the Muhammad Ali eect is observable in
individuals’ general perceptions of the self and others. That is, given that traits imply
a greater stability than specific behaviours, it becomes important to test whether
individuals ascribe greater levels of the trait honesty than the trait intelligence to
themselves than to others. Third, we test three explanations of the Muhammad Ali
eect, and predict that individuals regard honesty as (a) more desirable, (b) more
controllable, and (c) less verifiable than intelligence. Finally, we explore whether
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judgements of desirability, controllability, and verifiability mediate the Muhammad
Ali eect.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants were 156 Free University undergraduate students. They were recruited
through an advertisement in the Free University paper. The experimental session
took place in 15 separate cubicles and included several questionnaires (most of which
were unrelated to this study). Participants were paid Dfl. 15.00 (15 Dutch guilders is
about $9 in American currency). The experiment used a 2 (Trait Term: honesty versus
intelligence) by 2 (Trait Valence: positive versus negative) mixed-factor design,
with Trait Term represented as a within-participants factor. Trait Valence was a
between-participants factor, and was included to examine the generalizability of the
Muhammad Ali eect across both poles of each trait dimension.
Judgements of Desirability, Controllability, Verifiability, and Self–Other Superiority
We assessed judgements of desirability by asking ‘How positive versus negative do you
regard honesty?’ (dishonesty, intelligence, unintelligence; 1 extremely negative,
11 extremely positive) and ‘How desirable versus undesirable do you regard
honesty?’ (1 extremely undesirable, 11 extremely desirable). Responses to the two
questions were significantly correlated (for honesty, dishonesty, intelligence, and
unintelligence, respective r(156)s were 0.77, 0.40, 0.62, and 0.48, all ps50.01). Thus,
we derived and entered the mean for each trait in subsequent analyses.
We assessed judgements of controllability by asking ‘To what extent can a person
change his/her honesty in a direction he or she desires (e.g. becoming more honest)’
(1 not at all changeable, 11 very changeable), and ‘To what extent can one
influence honesty, such that one can choose whether or not to be honest’ (1 not at
all modifiable, 11 very modifiable). Responses to the two questions were signifi-
cantly correlated (for honesty, dishonesty, intelligence, and unintelligence, respective
r(156)s were 0.64, 0.52, 0.59 and 0.59, all ps50.01). Thus, we derived and entered the
mean for each trait in subsequent analyses.
We assessed judgements of verifiability by asking ‘To what extent can one infer
honesty from someone’s behaviour (1 not at all inferable, 11 very inferable) and
‘How easy or dicult is it to judge someone’s honesty on the basis of his/her
behaviour?’ (1 very dicult, 11 very easy). Responses to the two questions were
significantly correlated (for honesty, dishonesty, intelligence, and unintelligence,
respective r(156)s were 0.77, 0.73, 0.79, and 0.80, all ps50.01). Thus, we derived and
entered the mean for each trait in subsequent analyses.
We assessed general perceptions of self–other superiority by asking ‘How honest
(e.g. dishonest, intelligent, unintelligent) are you in comparison to the average student
at the Free University’. Participants responded to an 11-point scale (1 I am much
less honest than the average Free University student, 6 I am as honest as the average
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Free University student, and 11 I am much more honest than the average Free
University student).
RESULTS
Test of the Muhammad Ali Eect
Degree of self–other superiority was analysed in a 2 (Trait Valence) by 2 (Trait Term)
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the latter factor being a within-participants
variable. Consistent with the Muhammad Ali eect, relative to others, partici-
pants perceived themselves as more honest and less dishonest (M 7.22, S.D. 1.42)
than intelligent and unintelligent (M 6.77, S.D. 1.45), as indicated by a main
eect for Trait Term, F(1,154) 7.86, p5 0.01. Neither the main eect for Trait
Valence, F(1,154) 0.16, n.s., nor the interaction of Trait Valence and Trait Term,
F(1,154) 1.67, n.s., was significant, indicating that the Muhammad Ali is not
moderated by the positive versus negative poles of the trait terms.
Tests Relevant to the Desirability, Controllability, and Verifiability Explanations
Judgements of desirability, controllability, and verifiability were submitted to three 2
(Trait Valence) by 2 (Trait Term) ANOVAs, with the latter variable being a within-
participants variable. We recoded ratings of desirability in the negative valence
condition so that higher scores indicate greater negativity. Consistent with the
desirability explanation, a main eect for Trait Term, F(1,154) 124.97, p5 0.001,
revealed that participants viewed honesty (M 9.56, S.D. 1.25) as more desir-
able than intelligence (M 8.30, S.D. 1.27), and viewed dishonesty (M 9.98,
S.D. 1.04) as more undesirable than unintelligence (M 8.39, S.D. 1.45). No
other eect for judgements of desirability was significant.
Consistent with the controllability explanation, a main eect for Trait Term,
F(1,154) 187.20, p5 0.001, revealed that participants viewed honesty and dis-
honesty (M 8.28, S.D. 1.91) as more controllable than intelligence and
unintelligence (M 5.38, S.D. 2.23). No other eect for judgements of control-
lability was significant.
Finally, consistent with the verifiability explanation, a main eect of Trait Term,
F(1,154) 13.23, p5 0.001, revealed that participants viewed honesty and dishonesty
(M 5.98, S.D. 2.19) as less verifiable than intelligence and unintelligence
(M 6.74, S.D. 2.31). No other eect for judgements of verifiability was significant.
Mediation of the Muhammad Ali Eect by Judgements of Desirability,
Controllability, and Verifiability
We examined the patterns of intercorrelations among the three possible mediators of
the Muhammad Ali eect (i.e. judgements of desirability, controllability, and
verifiability). Correlational analyses revealed that these associations were inconsistent
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and modest in magnitude. Only two of six possible correlations were significant.
For honesty, there were significant links between desirability and controllability
judgements, r(156) 0.30, p5 0.001, and between controllability and verifiability
judgements, r(156) 0.34, p5 0.001. For intelligence, none of the judgements were
significantly correlated.
To provide evidence relevant to the mediating role of the three judgements, we
examined whether the Muhammad Ali eect becomes substantially weaker or even
absent when we control for judgements of desirability, controllability, and verifi-
ability. Mediation of all three judgements was examined in a 2 (Trait Valence) by 2
(Trait Term) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), in which judgements of desirability,
controllability, and verifiability were included simultaneously as covariates. In
support of mediation, this analysis revealed that the main eect for Trait Term was no
longer significant, F(1,151) 1.99, n.s. To determine more precisely which of the
three judgements mediated the Muhammad Ali eect, we conducted three separate
analyses of covariance, in which each of these judgements was included as a covariate.
First, a 2 (Trait Valence) by 2 (Trait Term) ANCOVA, in which judgements of
desirability were included as a covariate, revealed that the main eect for Trait Term
was no longer significant, F(1,153) 0.44, n.s. This supports the mediating role of
judgements of desirability in account for the Muhammad Ali eect. Second, a 2 (Trait
Valence) by 2 (Trait Term) ANCOVA, in which judgements of controllability were
included as a covariate, revealed that the main eect for Trait Term remained
significant, F(1,153) 5.57, p5 0.05. Third, a 2 (Trait Valence) by 2 (Trait Term)
ANCOVA, in which judgements of verifiability were included as a covariate, revealed
that the main eect for Trait Term remained significant, F(1,153) 9.44, p5 0.01.
Thus, these analyses reveal that judgements of desirability mediate the Muhammad
Ali eect, whereas judgements of controllability and verifiability do not mediate the
Muhammad Ali eect. Moreover, given that the associations among the mediators
was inconsistent and modest in magnitude, these analyses provide evidence in support
of the unique contribution of desirability in accounting for the Muhammad Ali
eect.1
DISCUSSION
The present study among Dutch participants provides evidence in support of the
generality of the Muhammad Ali eect, in that perceived superiority was more
pronounced for the trait honesty than for the trait intelligence. These findings extend
and complement prior research, conducted in the United States, which has focused on
self–other judgements for specific behaviours (Allison et al., 1989;. Van Lange, 1991).
The current findings also provide evidence relevant to three potential explanations of
the Muhammad Ali eect. Individuals perceive honesty as more desirable, more
1Not surprisingly, correlational analyses corroborated the results of the ANCOVAs, supporting the
mediating role of judgements of desirability, rather than judgements of controllability or verifiability.
Dierences in the extent to which honesty was viewed as more desirable than intelligence were positively
associated with dierences in the extent to which individuals viewed themselves as more superior in terms
of honesty than in terms of intelligence, r(156) 0.16, p5 0.05. Such links were not significant for
judgements of controllability, r(156)ÿ0.05, n.s., or verifiability, r(156) 0.11, n.s.
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controllable, and less verifiable than they perceive intelligence, thereby providing
evidence for Allison et al.’s theorizing. That is, the potential mechanisms underlying
the Muhammad Ali eect are threefold: the belief in one’s unique moral qualities is
exceptionally desirable, indicative of good intentions (e.g. I choose to be honest), and
relatively easy to sustain. Yet, as our mediation analyses revealed, the Muhammad
Ali eect is stronger among individuals who exhibit greater tendencies toward
perceiving honesty as more desirable than intelligence. Because such mediation was
nonsignificant for judgements of controllability and judgements of verifiability, the
actual mechanism underlying the Muhammad Ali eect, as observed in the present
study, would seem to be rooted in the tendency to regard honesty as more desirable
than intelligence.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Muhammad Ali eect has only been
demonstrated among students who are asked to compare themselves with other
students at their university (see Allison et al., 1989; Van Lange, 1991). Presumably,
students are not only more intelligent than non-students, but are also likely to regard
intelligence as more desirable than non-students. If it is indeed true that non-students
value intelligence to a lesser extent, then it is plausible that the Muhammad Ali eect
may be even more pronounced among non-students. Of course, this does not exclude
the possibility that the Muhammad Ali eect may be substantially weaker or even
reversed among populations or in contexts in which intelligence, rather than morality,
is regarded as the more desirable attribute. Yet, given that much of human life unfolds
in the context of dyadic or group interaction, it would be quite a challenge to identify
populations or contexts (at least, social contexts) in which intelligence would be
regarded as more desirable than morality. In the final analysis, the Muhammad Ali
eect may well be rooted in experiences of social interaction, which incite the
desirability of moral actions to a greater degree than the desirability of intelligent
actions.
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